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Abstract
Background: Although the “right not to know” is well established in international regulations, it has been heavily
debated. Ubiquitous results from extended exome and genome analysis have challenged the right not to know.
American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics (ACMG) Recommendations urge to inform about incidental
findings that pretend to be accurate and actionable. However, ample clinical cases raise the question whether
these criteria are met. Many incidental findings are of uncertain significance (IFUS). The eager to feedback
information appears to enter the field of IFUS and thereby threaten the right not to know. This makes it imperative
to investigate the arguments for and against a right not to know for IFUS.
Discussion: This article investigates how the various arguments for and against a right not to know hold for IFUS.
The main investigated arguments are: hypothetical utilitarianism, the right-based argument, the feasibility argument,
the value of knowledge argument, the argument from lost significance, the empirical argument, the duty to
disclose argument, the avoiding harm argument; the argument from principle, from autonomy, from privacy, as
well as the argument from the right to an open future. The analysis shows that both sides in the debate have
exaggerated the importance of incidental findings.
Summary: Opponents of a right not to know have exaggerated the importance of IFUS, while proponents have
exaggerated the need to be protected from something that is not knowledge. Hence, to know or not to know is
not the question. The question is whether we should be able to stay ignorant of incidental findings of uncertain
significance, if we want to. The answer is yes: As long as the information is not accurate and/or actionable:
ignorance is bliss. When answering questions that are not asked, we need to think twice.
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“Medical science has made such tremendous progress
that there is hardly a healthy human left.”
Aldous Huxley
Background
“Do not answer questions not asked.” This general prov-
erb has found many expressions, e.g., in “The Knight’s
Tale” from 2001 William exclaims: “Herald, do not an-
swer questions you do not know the answer to!” and in
Men in Black Agent K states: “Don’t ask questions you
don’t want to know the answer to.” While such state-
ments go well in fiction, in science things are different.
Research oftentimes gives us new knowledge that we did
not ask for, but that changes the world. In predictive
medicine, and in genetics in particular, this is different
too. New knowledge is found – knowledge that is im-
portant and needs to be communicated. However, when
giving answers to questions people do not have, the an-
swers have to be reliable and helpful. That is, they have
to be accurate and actionable. If not, people are gener-
ally considered to have a right not to be informed. This
is highly topical as new omics, such as integrative Per-
sonal Omics Profile (iPOP), generates a wealth of data
(>3 billion measurements), finding a huge amount of
Correspondence: b.m.hofmann@medisin.uio.no
1Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Gjøvik, Norway
2Centre for Medical Ethics, University of Oslo, PO Box 1130, Blindern, N-0318
Oslo, Norway
© 2016 Hofmann. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Hofmann BMC Medical Ethics  (2016) 17:13 
DOI 10.1186/s12910-016-0096-2
variants (>3 million single nucleotide variants) with un-
certain or unknown significance [1]. Even for well char-
acterized genes, such as BRCA1 and BRCA2, there are
variants of uncertain significance [2].
The right not to know is recognized in international
and national regulation. According to the European
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine Article
10.2 “[e]veryone is entitled to know any information col-
lected about his or her health. However, the wishes of in-
dividuals not to be so informed shall be observed”. In the
World Medical Association 1981/1995 Article 7d it is
stated that “the patient has the right not to be informed
on his/her explicit request, unless required for the protec-
tion of another person’s life,” and the UNESCO Declar-
ation on the Human Genome, Article 5c claims that “[t]he
right of every individual to decide whether or not to be in-
formed of the results of genetic examination and the
resulting consequences should be respected”.
This “right not to know” has been heavily debated [3–
16]. In particular, it has been argued that technological
progress in genomics (and other –omics) makes the
right not to know obsolete [17–23]. The ACMG recom-
mendations for reporting of incidental findings in clin-
ical exome and genome sequencing lists 57 (56) genes
and 24 disorders that should be tested when using ex-
ome or genome sequencing as these are associated with
phenotypes for which “preventive measures and/or treat-
ments [are] available and disorders in which individuals
with pathogenic mutations might be asymptomatic for
long periods of time.” [24]. Therefore, they favor ignor-
ing patients’ preferences and recognize that in doing so
they violate patient autonomy and a right not to know
[24]. Moreover, genetics professionals appear to think
that to know is better than not to know [25] even when
the information is actionable [26].
Although these recommendations have stirred a lively
debate [27–46] there has been little attention to what
kind of information is gained from such tests in practice
and how that influences the right not to know. Is the in-
formation accurate and actionable, i.e., do they provide
helpful knowledge or confusing non-validated informa-
tion? A recent case referred in The New York Times
may illustrate this:
“Jennifer was 39 and perfectly healthy, but her
grandmother had died young from breast cancer, so
she decided to be tested for mutations in two genes
known to increase risk for the disease. When a genetic
counselor offered additional tests for 20 other genes
linked to various cancers, Jennifer said yes. The more
information, the better, she thought. The results, she
said, were “surreal.” She did not have mutations in the
breast cancer genes, but did have one linked to a high
risk of stomach cancer. In people with a family history
of the disease, that mutation is considered so risky
that patients who are not even sick are often advised
to have their stomachs removed. But no one knows
what the finding might mean in someone like Jennifer,
whose family has not had the disease” [47].
The provided information is not helpful and it is fair
to ask whether Jennifer has a right to be ignorant. There
are divided opinions about this. However, as the authors
in NYT point out, what is revealed in Jennifer’s case is
not knowledge, but risk information causing questions,
uncertainty, and anxiety [47]. Hence, one could argue
that the discussion of a right not to know is irrelevant,
as what is presented is not knowledge. It is barely infor-
mation. It is data with unknown significance.
On the other hand it is argued that this is information
about a potential life-threatening risk factor and “that
clinicians and laboratory personnel have a fiduciary duty
to prevent harm by warning patients and their families
about certain incidental findings and that this principle
supersedes concerns about autonomy” [24]. Let us for
the sake of the argument accept that there is significant
uncertainty related to incidental findings in exome and
genome analysis. Even ACMG recognizes that “there are
insufficient data on penetrance and clinical utility to
fully support these recommendations” and “that there
was insufficient evidence about benefits, risks, and costs
of disclosing incidental findings to make evidence-based
recommendations” [24]. Moreover, they acknowledge
that to a large extent “the Working Group drew upon
the clinical judgment of its members” [24].
As it is argued that we have to discard the right not to
know in exome and genome analysis, and this appears to
extend to incidental findings of uncertain1 significance2
(IFUS), it becomes imperative to investigate the argu-
ments for and against a right not to know for IFUS. Do
the arguments hold? Are they relevant? It will be argued
that few of the arguments for and against a right not to
know hold for IFUS. Even more, they are not relevant,
as IFUS at best is information, and not knowledge3.
Hence, there is a right to remain ignorant about test re-
sults with uncertain significance. Discussing the right
not to know in such cases only confuses the matter. Let
me review some of the arguments in order to investigate
their relevance, starting with the arguments against the
right not to know.
Discussion
Arguments against a “right not to know”
The ACMG recommendations argue from a kind of
hypothetical utilitarianism: the information must be
conveyed to the person as this will potentially improve
the person’s health and potentially even save the life of
the person. The argument is in line with traditional
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arguments for protecting the best interest of a person
[48, 49]. “It seems uncontroversial to state that almost
everyone would (and perhaps even should) want to
know genetic information that could lead to an interven-
tion that would prevent or mitigate serious morbidity or
mortality” [18]. One may, of course, argue that it is quite
unclear what “would” and “could” means in such state-
ments, and that they are based on biased conception of
beneficence, ignoring risk and harm. Let that be as it
may. In the case of IFUS it is fundamentally uncertain
whether there is any benefit what so ever. Genetic risk
scores appear to have lower discriminative accuracy than
clinical risk factors, and common complex disorders are
only partially heritable. “Most genetic variants may only
alter the disease susceptibility risk by a factor of 1.1–1.6,
and usually a large number of genetic variants will have a
bearing on the risk … In most cases of polymorphic vari-
ants, the predictive value would be too small for any inter-
vention to be appropriate ….” [50]. Hence, when accuracy
is poor, if existing at all, and actionability is speculative,
the argument does not hold. Moreover, there is little evi-
dence of impact on behavior change [49, 51].
There are also right-based arguments against a right
not to know. They may be based on third parties rights,
e.g. the hypothetical right not to know in the future of
one person may be overruled by the right to know (now)
of another person, e.g., a parent or guardian: “To mask
or withhold the incidental finding is to state that the
child’s right not-to-know supersedes the parent’s oppor-
tunity to discover a lifethreatening risk factor” [24]. It
may also be argued that the right not to know has to be
balanced against other rights and other kinds of ethically
relevant interests, as it is not a right that outdoes all
other considerations [52]. “The idea that there is a gen-
eral right not to know health information that trumps
other interests should be rejected. Such a presumed
right must be balanced against other competing rights
and other interests.” [53]. E.g., in genetic testing of chil-
dren it is argued that the benefits of disclosing predictive
genetic information to a parent can override the goal of
deferring a child’s choice to be tested for that informa-
tion until adulthood [54].
These arguments presume either that somebody else’s
right to know or potential benefit trumps (a potentially
acceptable) right not to know. However, in the case of
IFUS there is no violation of others’ rights as there is
nothing to know (in terms of accuracy and/or actionabil-
ity), and it is hard to see how rights to know or other in-
terests outrun the right not to know, if there is little to
know.
Yet other arguments against a right not to know are
arguments from (re)classification. They try to undermine
a “right not to know” by arguing that it is not a right
[52], only an interest, and that the interest not to know
has to be balanced against other interests [7, 55]. How-
ever, even if we accept this argument, proponents would
have to argue that the interest of being informed about
IFUS overrides an interest not to be informed about IFUS.
A related argument against the right not to know
claims that it is not a fundamental or a basic right. The
right not to know is not found among the basic rights
presented in theories of rights. It is derived from other,
more fundamental rights, such as freedom or autonomy:
“The argument in favour of a right not to know is based
on the autonomy of the individual” [8, 56]. Moreover,
the right not to know does not always protect the right
it is derived from [21, 52, 57]. Again, even if we accept
these arguments, it does not follow that there are other
more basic rights that trump a right not to be informed
about something that is neither accurate nor actionable.
There are also counterarguments from feasibility. E.g.,
for something to be a right it must be possible to exer-
cise it [58, 59]. Or in another phrasing: to know whether
people have a preference not to know, you have to in-
form them [4]. However, the traditional ought-implies-
can-argument does not apply in the IFUS case. Here
there is no clear imperative to inform, so the argument
falls. On the contrary it illustrates shortcomings of the
feasibility argument: if there is little to know, it cannot
undermine (or support) a right to know it.
A more principled counter-argument is that knowledge
is a good in itself according to which a“right to remain
ignorant” is a contradiction. This argument often refers
to Aristotle’s conception of man: “all men by nature de-
sire to know” [52] or a Kantian perspective where the
“right to remain in ignorance” is an irrational attitude
[13, 60, 61]. It may of course also refer to a Socratic/Pla-
tonic conception of knowledge to be action-guiding.
Hiding information hampers autonomy, and hence, pro-
motes paternalism. In the case of IFUS, it is hard to
understand how information can increase autonomy. It
is not irrational to refuse information that is not accur-
ate and/or actionable. On the contrary, to claim that you
need to know about IFUS, is paternalistic.
There are also counter-arguments from lost signifi-
cance (or altered relevance). For predictive genetic test-
ing or carrier testing of monogenetic conditions a right
not to know makes sense, but in the new setting this
right has lost its significance [24, 38]. E.g., ignorance
made sense with Huntington’s disease, where little could
be done, but it does not make sense in a world of exten-
sive genetic tests of potential great benefit [18, 62–64].
This is a petitio principii, as it presumes what has to be
proven, i.e., that something can be done. In case of IFUS
the information is uncertain and not actionable, and
hence, of little relevance.
There are also empirical counter arguments (in addition
to the non-feasibility argument mentioned above), e.g.,
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that most people would like to be informed [18] and that
only few like not to be informed [53]. In addition to the
basic “naturalistic fallacy,” reasoning from is to ought, we
do not know what people prefer in the IFUS case. Studies
of people’s preferences ask whether they would like to
have information that is accurate and actionable, and sel-
dom about uncertain and inactionable information. We
do know, however, that genetic professionals tend to think
it is good to be informed [25, 26].
Correspondingly, it has been argued that people “are
not as autonomous as is generally assumed by the de-
fenders of the right not to know,” [53] and hence, the
right not to know has reduced weight. This line of argu-
ment refers to studies that show that those few who do
not want to know are not fully autonomous [53]. If they
were autonomous, they would like to know. This kind of
argument raises the obvious question of why we think
that only those who do not want to know have reduced
autonomy? If people in general have reduced autonomy,
the imperative to (be able to) inform them may be as
undermined as the right not to know. Be that as it may,
in the case of IFUS, the argument fails, as there is noth-
ing to know. There seems to be a fair agreement that au-
tonomy requires understanding, and IFUS does not
promote understanding of one’s health.
There is also a counterargument from professional eth-
ics, as the right not to know goes contrary to the doc-
tor’s “duty to disclose” [4]. However, it is not clear that a
duty to disclose includes IFUS. On the contrary, and as
the case in the introduction illustrates, informing about
IFUS may challenge the principle of primum non nocere.
The same goes for another argument from principle,
e.g. that a right not to know goes against the principle of
solidarity or that it can harm others [65] as it prohibits
disclosing vital information to family members. Again,
even if one acknowledges and appreciates the solidarity
principle or the harm principle, the argument loses force
because the information is not vital in the case of IFUS,
as it is not accurate or actionable. It is far from obvious
that it avoids harm to others. On the contrary, it may
cause psychological harm to the person and family
members if disclosed.
The legal counterargument does not bite either. One
version of the argument goes like this: if a person, who
has claimed his right not to know, is given information
that was lifesaving, it is hard to see how a jury or judge
would blame the persons or institution that gave him
the information. Conversely, in a court case with a per-
son who has waived his right not to know would claim
that “if I was told that this could be of vital importance
to my life and health, I would obviously not have waived
the right,” the court may very well agree. Hence, the
right not to know would not be valid in judicial practice,
and only therefore, at best, be of theoretical interest.
However, in the case of IFUS, the lifesaving premise does
not hold. If the information is not actionable, it is far
from obvious that a court or judge will blame anybody
for not informing.
Hence, the arguments against the right not to know
do not hold for IFUS. Let me therefore now turn to ar-
guments for a right to know before summarizing the ar-
guments in Table 1.
Arguments for a right not to know
One of the main arguments for a right not to know has
a (utilitarian) basis in avoiding harm. A person may per-
fectly well want to stay ignorant in order to avoid psy-
chological harm [4]. In the case of genetic testing of
children such harms have been specified: “The potential
harms caused by childhood genetic testing might include
damage to the child’s self-esteem, distortion of the
family’s perceptions of the child, loss of future adult au-
tonomy and confidentiality, discrimination against the
child in education, employment or insurance, and ad-
verse effects on the child’s capacity to form future rela-
tionships” [66]. If IFUS do not harm a person in these or
other ways, this argument may be dismissed. However, if
IFUS is able to cause any (psychological) harm, one may
argue that the avoiding-harm-argument holds. But not
for defending the right not to know, but only for a right
not to be informed about IFUS.
Another related argument for the right not to know
reasons from future flourishing (and liberty). Knowledge
of potential but uncertain risks may reduce human pros-
pering and flourishing. “I should not go hiking, as my
genome is not so strong.” I.e., the knowledge may reduce
a person’s actual flourishing or liberty. Again, the infor-
mation of IFUS is not knowledge, and one could argue
that it should not be able to reduce anyone’s flourishing
or liberty. If it does, one makes erroneous inference
from the information. However, if IFUS shows to reduce
persons flourishing, one could argue that the argument
holds. Again, at best the argument supports a right not
to be informed about IFUS.
There are also various autonomy based arguments for
a right not to know. E.g. it is argued that choosing not
to know is a way to exercise one’s autonomy, i.e., a right
to informational self-determination [4]. The patient, and
not the professional, should decide what information to
be conveyed to the patient. It is the patient who takes
on the responsibility and the action of deciding which
information he or she wants or does not want to receive
[49]. Another argument from (lack of increased) auton-
omy goes like this: when no alternative treatments or ac-
tions are available, knowing does not increase autonomy.
Hence, you may as well stay ignorant. Not knowing does
not make you subject to paternalism (and i.e., not reduced
autonomy). On the contrary, conveying information
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without the request of the person is a type of paternalism
[65]. It can also be argued that present ignorance pre-
serves and promotes the potential of future autonomous
choices and that it can be defended from “the right to an
open future” – in particular for children [67, 68].
In the case of IFUS, we do not even need to enter the
debate on whether you can be autonomous if you do not
want to know [49, 54, 68, 69]. It does not seem to
threaten a person’s present or future autonomy to refuse
information about test results that are not accurate or
actionable. However, this does not provide a knock
down argument for the right not to know. It only pro-
vides an argument for a right not to be informed about
IFUS.
There are also arguments for the right not to know
from the basic right to privacy. Laurie argues that
“[c]ontrol of information about ourselves must be an es-
sential part of any concept of ourselves as autonomous
persons, but “control” should not be limited merely to
control of who has access to that information. It should
also include the facility not to accept the information ab
initio. A concept of “control” which is wide enough to
encompass this notion permits us to retain a private
sphere that is truly our own.” [7]. Although this may jus-
tify the non-generation of knowledge in the first place, it
is more challenging to use this to argue for a right not
to know existing vital information about oneself. How-
ever, in the case of IFUS, this is straight forward, as nei-
ther the generation, nor the delivery of information, is of
known vital importance. However, it may be argued that
IFUS does not represent an intrusion into the private
sphere, as the meaning of IFUS is unclear. But, as the
example with Jennifer in the introduction illustrates,
the information may definitely matter. Although, this is
not an argument for a right not to know in general, it
may be used to argue for not being informed about
IFUS.
As with the counter-arguments to the right not to
know, there are also empirical arguments for such a
right. Many reasonable and autonomous adults choose
not to know genetic information of outmost importance
to their health. Moreover, some do insist in not knowing
such information. E.g., up to 80 % of adults with a family
history of Huntington’s disease refuse genetic testing
[70–72]. As people who can take a very accurate test for
a severe disease,4 do not want to know, then others
should be given the same option for IFUS. However, this
argument reasons from IS to OUGHT. In addition, the
empirical premise for the argument is not true in the
case of IFUS, as there is little evidence about whether
people do or do not want to be informed about IFUS.
There is also an argument for the right not to know
from the absence of duties. If there is no duty to inform
persons about health risks, e.g., about IFUS on an indi-
vidual level, then there is a right not to know. However,
the absence of a duty does not necessarily correspond to
a right, so this argument has to be rephrased: If there is
a duty not to inform persons about health risks that are
not of vital importance for their lives, then there is a
corresponding right not to know health related
Table 1 Overview of the arguments for and against a right not to know and short outline of the problems with these arguments
Con Pro
Hypothetical utilitarianism: The information will be important in the
future. Problem: petitio principii
Avoiding harm: Being ignorant to avoid (psychological) harm of information.
Problem: Information about IFUS is not knowledge.
Rights-based arguments: Third party rights or interests override the rights
of the individual. Problem: No defined third party rights or interests due
to lack of accuracy and actionability
Argument for future flourishing (and liberty): Information about IFUS may
reduce (future) flourishing and liberty. Problem: IFUS is not knowledge
(and should not reduce flourishing)
Arguments from (re)classification: It is not a right, but an interest, or not a
basic right. Problem: Not relevant for IFUS
Autonomy based arguments: not knowing is exercising autonomy.
Problem: IFUS does not provide knowledge.
It is not feasible: It is not possible to exercise a right not to know.
Problem: Irrelevant as there is nothing to know.
Privacy: there is a right to retain a private sphere without intrusion.
Problem: It is not clear that providing IFUS data is an intrusion.
Knowledge is a good thing in itself: A right not to know is a
contradiction of this good. Problem: There is not knowledge.
Empirical arguments: People with accurate tests for severe diseases prefer
not to be informed. Problem: reasoning from IS to OUGHT
Argument from lost significance: A right not to know is not relevant in
the age of genomics (with potential great benefit). Problem: petitio
principio
Absence of duties: no duty not to inform, i.e., no right not to be
informed. Problem: absence of a duty does not correspond with a right.
Empirical argument: Most people want to be informed. Problem:
reasoning from IS to OUGHT
The right to an open future: ignorance preserves the potential of open
future choices. Problem: IFUS does not represent information that
threatens an open future (formally).
Argument from duty to disclose. Problem: counters primum non nocere,
and that there is no knowledge to disclose
Argument from principle (of solidarity or) of avoiding harm (to others):
not knowing, may harm others. Problem: no knowledge, no harm
Legal argument: Would not be litigated for giving vital information.
Problem: IFUS is not vital information.
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information that is not of vital importance to one’s life.
So far, there are few knock down arguments for a duty
not to inform persons about IFUS. It may be reasonable
not to inform, but there is no imperative.
Hence, there are a series of arguments for the right
not to know, and many problems with them. Table 1
summarizes the arguments for and against the right not
to know that have been reviewed so far.
Hence, both the arguments against and for a right not
to know do not apply to the case of IFUS. As shown,
there are many reasons for this, but one common under-
lying factor is that IFUS does not represent knowledge.
Data - yes, information – maybe, but knowledge – no.
Hence, much of the debate on incidental findings of un-
certain significance is misplaced. “Looking at the entire
genome will reveal “incidental” findings, which are unre-
lated to the clinical request, as well as a number of gen-
etic variants for which the meaning remains unclear”
[49]. Both sides of the debate appear to have hyped the
importance of such findings. Those who want to inform
have exaggerated the importance of the findings for sav-
ing lives, while those who want to stay ignorant have ex-
aggerated the need to be protected from something that
is not knowledge (information without significance).
Limitations and reflections
This study is not exhaustive. There may of course be
other arguments for and against a right not to know
than those presented here. However, would they make a
difference? Most arguments for or against refer to some
content of the knowledge involved, e.g., either that it is
accurate or actionable.
Accordingly, one could dismiss the whole issue of
whether there is a right to know or not to know for
IFUS in the first place. We could have concluded dir-
ectly that to know or not to know, that is not the ques-
tion. The question is: can I trust the information and
will it make any change? However, there are three rea-
sons why this investigation has been important. First,
the right not to know, and the duty to inform, have been
at the core of ethical debates on incidental findings in-
cluding IFUS. Second, tests that are considered to render
significant information, are in practice IFUS. Third, the
arguments for or against a right not to know may have
been valid for a right not to be informed about IFUS.
Actually, several arguments support a right not to be in-
formed about IFUS: if information from genetic tests is
not accurate or actionable, I may well be entitled to stay
uninformed about these from several perspectives: au-
tonomy, privacy, harm, open future, and flourishing/lib-
erty. However, if well informed about the limited value
of IFUS, it is not clear that the information harms or re-
duces autonomy, future flourishing or liberty. Empirical
studies are needed to clarify this and are most welcome.
The interesting thing with using IFUS as a case to dis-
cuss the right not to know is that it unpeels a series of
arguments that presuppose significant outcomes. E.g., as
series of empirical arguments become invalid, as they
presuppose that the information “will prevent serious
disease and perhaps even save the life” [18] or that most
people want information of incidental findings: “…. while
the right not to know may seem appropriate in the ab-
stract, people’s views change once they are presented
with a case where a specific piece of lifesaving informa-
tion is available.” [18]. All such arguments presuppose
that the information is of importance. However, with
IFUS it is not.
In the same way as many of the arguments for inform-
ing people of incidental findings presuppose that the in-
formation is accurate and actionable, I have here
presupposed that it is not, or more precisely, I have de-
fined that IFUS is not accurate or actionable. Hence, I
have tried to twist the presuppositions of the con-
arguments. It is an empirical question how many test re-
sults that are IFUS, and it is an interpretative issue when
they are IFUS. But if IFUS exist, I have tried to show
that most of the arguments for and against a right to be
informed do not apply.
It is of course interesting from a principled point of
view to discuss whether there is a right not to know (or
a duty to inform). However, when such principled debates,
using idealized conditions of accurate and actionable in-
formation, are used to regulate practice where such condi-
tions are not met, it is appropriate to revisit the debate
and the arguments with real world conditions, e.g., like
those of Jennifer at the outset of this article.
It is also an open question what an accurate test result
means. For various types of diagnostic tests there are
standards of accuracy, e.g., in terms of sensitivity and
specificity. Incidental findings for genetic tests can be
considered to parallel screening, as there is no indication
for the test or the pre-test probability is low. For screen-
ing tests there are specific requirements, usually towards
99 % sensitivity and specificity. Accuracy can also be
assessed in terms of predictive values (negative and posi-
tive predictive values). Genetic test results tend to have
low predictive values [50]. Nevertheless, it is a normative
question where we set the limits.
It is also an open question what we consider as action-
able. I have here considered actions improving a person’s
health, because I consider those to be most important in
a health care setting. Actions with other purposes may
of course be of interest.
In the area of co-production of knowledge one should
be careful to give fixed definitions of knowledge. However,
the point here has not been to enter the diverse and in-
conclusive debates on epistemology, but to display that
there is a difference between data, information, and
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knowledge. The point is that dumping data or inaccurate
information on people is not making them knowledgeable.
Although I do support a right not to be informed
about IFUS, and this article has identified flaws with ar-
guments for and against the right not to know, it is
inconclusive with respect to this right in general. Never-
theless, I have revealed a significant asymmetry in how
the opponents and proponents appreciate the uncertain-
ties of potential benefits and the uncertainties of poten-
tial harms. The point here is that specific uncertainties
(in accuracy and actionability) undermine the potential-
ity of both benefits and harms. Hyping benefits or harms
does not help people like Jennifer5.
Conclusion
Most arguments for and against a right not to know fail
for IFUS. Mainly because they contain hyped premises
of incidental findings’ vital significance or their potential
harm respectively. Hence, to know or not to know, that
is not the question. The question is: can I trust the test
results and will they make any difference? I.e., will I be-
come diseased and can anything be done? IFUS cannot
answer these questions. Accordingly, if I cannot trust a
test result, and/or (if the result is accurate but) nothing
can be done to improve my health, there appear not to
be any compelling reason that I should be informed, if I
do not want to be. Correspondingly, one could claim a
right not to be given inaccurate and/or inactionable in-
formation. In the case of IFUS ignorance is bliss. When
answering questions that are not asked, we need to think
twice.
Endnotes
1In the literature there are many terms for findings
of uncertain significance: they are “unspecified,““un-
known,” “unclear”. They are also frequently coined “vari-
ants of uncertain significance” (VUS), where “uncertain”
can be replaced with the terms above. Uncertainty here
means that one may know of potential outcomes, but
that the probability is unknown. Hence, IFUS is not risk
information, as risk contains information of both out-
comes and probabilities.
2Significance here is defined as meaning that a test
result is accurate (so it can be trusted) and/or that it is
actionable, i.e., that something can be done with the ef-
fect of improving a person’s (future) health. Technically
accuracy is given in terms of sensitivity and specificity,
and it does not mean that these have to be 100 %. More-
over, significance does not include that something may
be done in the future, e.g., due to new treatments in the
future. The “or” between “accurate” and “actionable” ac-
knowledges accurate knowledge may be of value to a
person even if it is not actionable.
3Accordingly, knowledge here means that informa-
tion about a potential health condition following from a
test result is accurate or actionable.
4A positive test result is partly (“indirectly”) action-
able in terms of family planning (including PGD).
5It may of course be argued that the finding in Jenni-
fer’s case was not an “incidental” finding, but something
that was proposed to better assess her (breast) cancer
risk. It may have been discussed in a pre-test consult-
ation highlighting the fact the interpretation of positive
results in any of 20 the other genes will turn out to be
(very) difficult and/or limited. We do not know Jennifer’s
reflection when she assented, nor how she interpreted
the pre-test information. We only know that she defines
the results “surreal,” indicating that the result came as a
surprise. I am most thankful to one of the reviewers for
pointing this out.
Competing interests
I do not have any financial or other material, professional, or scholarly
relationships that involve the area under discussion in this manuscript, i.e., I
have no competing interests.
No patients are involved in this study and no ethical approval and consent
from patients/ participants is necessary (or possible).
Author’s contribution
I am the sole author of this article and have drafted, written, revised, and
submitted the manuscript myself.
Acknowledgement
Part of this research has been supported by The Commonwealth Fund
through the Harkness Fellowship at The Dartmouth Institute of Health Policy
and Clinical Practice (TDI). The views presented here are those of the author
and not necessarily those of The Commonwealth Fund their directors,
officers, or staff or of TDI.
Received: 11 November 2015 Accepted: 4 February 2016
References
1. Chen R, Mias GI, Li-Pook-Than J, et al. Personal omics profiling reveals
dynamic molecular and medical phenotypes. Cell. 2012;148(6):1293–307.
doi:10.1016/j.cell.2012.02.009 [published Online First: Epub Date].
2. Cheon JY, Mozersky J, Cook-Deegan R. Variants of uncertain significance in
BRCA: a harbinger of ethical and policy issues to come? Genome Med.
2014;6(12):121. doi:10.1186/s13073-014-0121-3 [published Online First: Epub
Date].
3. Uninformed consent. New tests raise questions over right not to know test
results. Hospital ethics / American Hospital Association. 1995.11(4):10–1.
4. Andorno R. The right not to know: an autonomy based approach. J Med
Ethics. 2004;30(5):435–9. doi:10.1136/jme.2002.001578. discussion 39–40
[published Online First: Epub Date].
5. Green J, Kentish J. The right not to know HIV-test results. Lancet. 1995;
345(8963):1508.
6. Kielstein R, Sass HM. Right not to know or duty to know? Prenatal screening
for polycystic renal disease. J Med Philos. 1992;17(4):395–405.
7. Laurie GT. In defence of ignorance: genetic information and the right not to
know. Eur J Health Law. 1999;6(2):119–32.
8. Malpas P. The right to remain in ignorance about genetic information–can
such a right be defended in the name of autonomy? N Z Med J. 2005;
118(1220):U1611.
9. Neumann H. Patients have the right not to know. Med World News. 1980;
21(13):63.
10. Raikka J. Freedom and a right (not) to know. Bioethics. 1998;12(1):49–63.
11. Sears RA. The right not to know. S D J Med. 1965;18:44.
Hofmann BMC Medical Ethics  (2016) 17:13 Page 7 of 9
12. Shaw MW. Testing for the Huntington gene: a right to know, a right not to
know, or a duty to know. Am J Med Genet. 1987;26(2):243–6. doi:10.1002/
ajmg.1320260202 [published Online First: Epub Date].
13. Takala T. The right to genetic ignorance confirmed. Bioethics. 1999;13(3–4):
288–93.
14. Weaver KD. Genetic screening and the right not to know. Issues Law Med.
1997;13(3):243–81.
15. Wilson J. To know or not to know? Genetic ignorance, autonomy and
paternalism. Bioethics. 2005;19(5–6):492–504.
16. Herring J, Foster C. “Please don’t tell me”. The right not to know. Camb Q
Healthc Ethics. 2012;21(1):20–9. doi:10.1017/s0963180111000466 [published
Online First: Epub Date].
17. Austad T. The right not to know–worthy of preservation any longer? An
ethical perspective. Clin Genet. 1996;50(2):85–8.
18. Berkman BE, Hull SC. The “right not to know” in the genomic era: time to
break from tradition? Am J Bioeth. 2014;14(3):28–31. doi:10.1080/15265161.
2014.880313 [published Online First: Epub Date].
19. Bortolotti L, Widdows H. The right not to know: the case of psychiatric
disorders. J Med Ethics. 2011;37(11):673–6. doi:10.1136/jme.2010.041111
[published Online First: Epub Date].
20. Pennings G. The right to privacy and access to information about one’s
genetic origins. Med Law. 2001;20(1):1–15.
21. Rhodes R. Genetic testing: is there a right not to know? MCN Am J Matern
Child Nurs. 2006;31(3):145.
22. Van Leeuwen E, Hertogh C. The right to genetic information: some
reflections on Dutch developments. J Med Philos. 1992;17(4):381–93.
23. Zinberg RE. Genetic testing: is there a right not to know? MCN Am J Matern
Child Nurs. 2006;31(3):144.
24. Green RC, Berg JS, Grody WW, et al. ACMG recommendations for reporting
of incidental findings in clinical exome and genome sequencing. Genet
Med. 2013;15(7):565–74. doi:10.1038/gim.2013.73 [published Online First:
Epub Date].
25. Lemke AA, Bick D, Dimmock D, et al. Perspectives of clinical genetics
professionals toward genome sequencing and incidental findings: a survey
study. Clin Genet. 2013;84(3):230–6. doi:10.1111/cge.12060 [published Online
First: Epub Date].
26. Yu J-H, Harrell Tanya M, Jamal Seema M, et al. Attitudes of Genetics
Professionals Toward the Return of Incidental Results from Exome and
Whole-Genome Sequencing. Am J Hum Genet. 2014;95(1):77–84. http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.ajhg.2014.06.004 [published Online First: Epub Date].
27. Anastasova V, Blasimme A, Julia S, et al. Genomic incidental findings:
reducing the burden to be fair. Am J Bioeth. 2013;13(2):52–4. doi:10.1080/
15265161.2012.754066 [published Online First: Epub Date].
28. Biesecker LG. The Nirvana fallacy and the return of results. Am J Bioeth.
2013;13(2):43–4. doi:10.1080/15265161.2013.755826 [published Online First:
Epub Date].
29. Borgelt E, Anderson JA, Illes J. Managing incidental findings: lessons from
neuroimaging. Am J Bioeth. 2013;13(2):46–7. doi:10.1080/15265161.2012.
754069 [published Online First: Epub Date].
30. Christenhusz GM, Devriendt K, Dierickx K. Disclosing incidental findings in
genetics contexts: a review of the empirical ethical research. Eur J Med
Genet. 2013;56(10):529–40. doi:10.1016/j.ejmg.2013.08.006 [published Online
First: Epub Date].
31. Christenhusz GM, Devriendt K, Van Esch H, et al. Ethical signposts for clinical
geneticists in secondary variant and incidental finding disclosure
discussions. Medicine, health care, and philosophy. 2014. doi: 10.1007/
s11019-014-9611-8. [published Online First: Epub Date]|
32. Clayton EW, Haga S, Kuszler P, et al. Managing incidental genomic findings:
legal obligations of clinicians. Genet Med. 2013;15(8):624–9. doi:10.1038/gim.
2013.7 [published Online First: Epub Date].
33. Costain G, Bassett AS. Incomplete knowledge of the clinical context as a
barrier to interpreting incidental genetic research findings. Am J Bioeth.
2013;13(2):58–60. doi:10.1080/15265161.2012.754063 [published Online First:
Epub Date].
34. Dal-Re R, Katsanis N, Katsanis S, et al. Managing incidental genomic findings
in clinical trials: fulfillment of the principle of justice. PLoS Med. 2014;11(1):
e1001584. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001584 [published Online First: Epub
Date].
35. Eckstein L, Garrett JR, Berkman BE. A framework for analyzing the ethics of
disclosing genetic research findings. J Law Med Ethics. 2014;42(2):190–207.
doi:10.1111/jlme.12135 [published Online First: Epub Date].
36. Garrett JR. Reframing the ethical debate regarding incidental findings in
genetic research. Am J Bioeth. 2013;13(2):44–6. doi:10.1080/15265161.2013.
757972 [published Online First: Epub Date].
37. Gliwa C, Berkman BE. Do researchers have an obligation to actively look for
genetic incidental findings? Am J Bioeth. 2013;13(2):32–42. doi:10.1080/
15265161.2012.754062 [published Online First: Epub Date].
38. Greenbaum D. If you don’t know where you are going, you might wind up
someplace else: incidental findings in recreational personal genomics. Am J
Bioeth. 2014;14(3):12–4. doi:10.1080/15265161.2013.879946 [published
Online First: Epub Date].
39. Jarvik GP, Amendola LM, Berg JS, et al. Return of genomic results to
research participants: the floor, the ceiling, and the choices in between. Am
J Hum Genet. 2014;94(6):818–26. doi:10.1016/j.ajhg.2014.04.009 [published
Online First: Epub Date].
40. Kleiderman E, Knoppers BM, Fernandez CV, et al. Returning incidental
findings from genetic research to children: views of parents of children
affected by rare diseases. J Med Ethics. 2014;40(10):691–6. doi:10.1136/
medethics-2013-101648 [published Online First: Epub Date].
41. Klitzman R, Appelbaum PS, Chung W. Return of secondary genomic
findings vs patient autonomy: implications for medical care. Jama. 2013;
310(4):369–70. doi:10.1001/jama.2013.41709 [published Online First: Epub
Date].
42. Klitzman R, Buquez B, Appelbaum PS, et al. Processes and factors involved
in decisions regarding return of incidental genomic findings in research.
Genet Med. 2014;16(4):311–7. doi:10.1038/gim.2013.140 [published Online
First: Epub Date].
43. Parens E, Appelbaum P, Chung W. Incidental findings in the era of whole
genome sequencing? Hast Cent Rep. 2013;43(4):16–9. doi:10.1002/hast.189
[published Online First: Epub Date].
44. Rehder CW, David KL, Hirsch B, et al. American College of Medical Genetics
and Genomics: standards and guidelines for documenting suspected
consanguinity as an incidental finding of genomic testing. Genet Med. 2013;
15(2):150–2. doi:10.1038/gim.2012.169 [published Online First: Epub Date].
45. Ulrich M. The duty to rescue in genomic research. Am J Bioeth. 2013;13(2):
50–1. doi:10.1080/15265161.2012.754067 [published Online First: Epub Date].
46. Vayena E, Tasioulas J. Genetic incidental findings: autonomy regained?
Genet Med. 2013;15(11):868–70. doi:10.1038/gim.2013.104 [published Online
First: Epub Date].
47. Grady D, Pollack A. Finding Risks, Not Answers, in Expanding Array of Gene
Tests. In: The New York Times. New York edn. New York: The New York
Times; 2014: A17.
48. Borry P, Howard HC, Senecal K, et al. Direct-to-consumer genome scanning
services. Also for children? Nat Rev Genet. 2009;10(1):8. doi:10.1038/nrg2501
[published Online First: Epub Date].
49. Borry P, Shabani M, Howard HC. Is there a right time to know? the right Not
to know and genetic testing in children. J Law Med Ethics. 2014;42(1):19–27.
50. Janssens AC, van Duijn CM. Genome-based prediction of common diseases:
advances and prospects. Hum Mol Genet. 2008;17(R2):R166–73. doi:10.1093/
hmg/ddn250 [published Online First: Epub Date].
51. Marteau TM, French DP, Griffin SJ, et al. Effects of communicating DNA-
based disease risk estimates on risk-reducing behaviours. The Cochrane
database of systematic reviews. 2010(10): Cd007275. doi: 10.1002/14651858.
CD007275.pub2. [published Online First: Epub Date].
52. Harris J, Keywood K. Ignorance, information and autonomy. Theor Med
Bioeth. 2001;22(5):415–36.
53. Helgesson G, Eriksson S, Swartling U. Limited relevance of the right not to
know–reflections on a screening study. Account Res. 2007;14(3):197–209.
doi:10.1080/08989620701456322 [published Online First: Epub Date].
54. Abdul-Karim R, Berkman BE, Wendler D, et al. Disclosure of incidental
findings from next-generation sequencing in pediatric genomic research.
Pediatrics. 2013;131(3):564–71. doi:10.1542/peds.2012-0084 [published
Online First: Epub Date].
55. Laurie GT. A response to Andorno. J Med Ethics. 2004;30:439–40.
56. The Human Genetics Commission. Whose hands on your genes? London:
The Human Genetics Commission; 2000.
57. Eriksson S. Should results from genetic research be returned to research
subjects and their biological relatives? TRAMES – A Journal of the
Humanities and Social Sciences. 2004;8:46–62.
58. Laurie GT. Challenging medical-legal norms. The role of autonomy,
confidentiality, and privacy in protecting individual and familial group rights
in genetic information. J Legal Med. 2001;22:1–54.
Hofmann BMC Medical Ethics  (2016) 17:13 Page 8 of 9
59. Bottis MC. Comment on a view favoring ignorance of genetic information:
confidentiality, autonomy, beneficence and the right not to know. Eur J
Health Law. 2000;7(2):173–83.
60. Rhodes R. Autonomy, respect, and genetic information policy: a reply to
Tuija Takala and Matti Hayry. J Med Philos. 2000;25(1):114–20. doi:10.1076/
0360-5310(200002)25:1;1-v;ft114 [published Online First: Epub Date].
61. Hayry M, Takala T. Genetic information, rights, and autonomy. Theor Med
Bioeth. 2001;22(5):403–14.
62. de Wert G. Predictive testing for Huntington disease and the right not to
know. Some ethical reflections. Birth Defects Orig Artic Ser. 1992;28(1):133–8.
63. Erez A, Plunkett K, Sutton VR, et al. The right to ignore genetic status of late
onset genetic disease in the genomic era; Prenatal testing for Huntington
disease as a paradigm. Am J Med Genet A. 2010;152a(7):1774–80. doi:10.
1002/ajmg.a.33432 [published Online First: Epub Date].
64. Hayden MR. Predictive testing for Huntington’s disease: a universal model?
Lancet Neurol. 2003;2(3):141–2.
65. Takala T. Genetic ignorance and reasonable paternalism. Theor Med Bioeth.
2001;22(5):485–91.
66. Duncan RE, Delatycki MB. Predictive genetic testing in young people for
adult-onset conditions: where is the empirical evidence? Clin Genet 2006.
2006;69(1):8–16. doi:10.1111/j.1399-0004.2005.00505.x. discussion 17–20
[published Online First: Epub Date].
67. Feinberg J. The child’s right to an open future. In: Aiken W, LaFollette H,
editors. Whose child? parental rights, parental authority and state power.
Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield; 1980. p. 124–53.
68. Davis DS. Genetic dilemmas and the child’s right to an open future. Hast
Cent Rep. 1997;27(2):7–15.
69. Ross KM, Reiff M. A perspective from clinical providers and patients:
researchers’ duty to actively look for genetic incidental findings. Am J
Bioeth. 2013;13(2):56–8. doi:10.1080/15265161.2012.754064 [published
Online First: Epub Date].
70. Creighton S, Almqvist EW, MacGregor D, et al. Predictive, pre-natal and
diagnostic genetic testing for Huntington’s disease: the experience in
Canada from 1987 to 2000. Clin Genet. 2003;63(6):462–75.
71. Robins Wahlin TB. To know or not to know: a review of behaviour and
suicidal ideation in preclinical Huntington’s disease. Patient Educ Couns.
2007;65(3):279–87. doi:10.1016/j.pec.2006.08.009 [published Online First:
Epub Date].
72. Tassicker RJ, Teltscher B, Trembath MK, et al. Problems assessing uptake of
Huntington disease predictive testing and a proposed solution. Eur J Hum
Genet. 2009;17(1):66–70. doi:10.1038/ejhg.2008.142.
•  We accept pre-submission inquiries 
•  Our selector tool helps you to find the most relevant journal
•  We provide round the clock customer support 
•  Convenient online submission
•  Thorough peer review
•  Inclusion in PubMed and all major indexing services 
•  Maximum visibility for your research
Submit your manuscript at
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central 
and we will help you at every step:
Hofmann BMC Medical Ethics  (2016) 17:13 Page 9 of 9
